Abstract. Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) is one of the important topics in cryptography. It aims to address a practical security problem: how to establish secure communication between two parties solely based on a shared password without requiring a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). After more than a decade of extensive research in this field, there have been several PAKE protocols available. The EKE and SPEKE schemes are perhaps the two most notable examples. Both techniques are however patented. In this paper, we review these techniques in detail and summarize various theoretical and practical weaknesses. In addition, we present a new PAKE solution called J-PAKE. Our strategy is to depend on well-established primitives such as the ZeroKnowledge Proof (ZKP). So far, almost all of the past solutions have avoided using ZKP for the concern on efficiency. We demonstrate how to effectively integrate the ZKP into the protocol design and meanwhile achieve good efficiency. Our protocol has comparable computational efficiency to the EKE and SPEKE schemes with clear advantages on security.
Introduction
Nowadays, the use of passwords is ubiquitous. From on-line banking to accessing personal emails, the username/password paradigm is by far the most commonly used authentication mechanism. Alternative authentication factors, including tokens and biometrics, require additional hardware, which is often considered too expensive for an application.
However, the security of a password is limited by its low-entropy. Typically, even a carefully chosen password only has about 20-30 bits entropy [3] . This makes passwords subject to dictionary attacks or simple exhaustive search.
Some systems willfully force users to remember cryptographically strong passwords, but that often creates more problems than it solves [3] .
Since passwords are weak secrets, they must be protected during transmission. Currently, the widely deployed method is to send passwords through SSL/TLS [29] . But, this requires a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in place; maintaining a PKI is expensive. In addition, using SSL/TLS is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks [3] . If a user authenticates himself to a phishing website by disclosing his password, the password will be stolen even though the session is fully encrypted.
The PAKE research explores an alternative approach to protect passwords without relying on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) at all [10, 16] . It aims to achieve two goals. First, it allows zero-knowledge proof of the password. One can prove the knowledge of the password without revealing it to the other party. Second, it performs authenticated key exchange. If the password is correct, both parties will be able to establish a common session key that no one else can compute.
The first milestone in PAKE research came in 1992 when Bellovin and Merrit introduced the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol [10] . Despite some reported weaknesses [16, 20, 23, 25] , the EKE protocol first demonstrated that the PAKE problem was at least solvable. Since then, a number of protocols have been proposed.
Many of them are simply variants of EKE, instantiating the "symmetric cipher" in various ways [7] .
The few techniques that claim to resist known attacks have almost all been patented. Most notably, EKE was patented by Lucent Technologies [12] , SPEKE by Phoenix Technologies [18] and SRP by Stanford University [28] .
The patent issue is arguably one of the biggest brakes in deploying a PAKE solution in practice [13] .
Past work

Security requirements
Before reviewing past solutions in detail, we summarize the security requirements that a PAKE protocol shall fulfill (also see [10, 11, 16, 28] ).
1. Off-line dictionary attack resistance -It does not leak any information that allows a passive/active attacker to perform off-line exhaustive search of the password.
2. Forward secrecy -It produces session keys that remain secure even when the password is later disclosed.
3. Known-key security -It prevents a disclosed session key from affecting the security of other sessions.
4. On-line dictionary attack resistance -It limits an active attacker to test only one password per protocol execution.
First, a PAKE protocol must resist off-line dictionary attacks. An attacker may be passive (only eavesdropping) or active (directly engaging in the key exchange). In either case, the communication must not reveal any datasay a hash of the password -that allows an attacker to learn the password through off-line exhaustive search.
Second, the protocol must be forward-secure. The key exchange is authenticated based on a shared password.
However, there is no guarantee on the long-term secrecy of the password. A well-designed PAKE scheme should protect past session keys even when the password is later disclosed. This property also implies that if an attacker knows the password but only passively observes the key exchange, he cannot learn the session key.
Third, the protocol must provide known key security. A session key lasts throughout the session. An exposed session key should not cause any global effect on the system, affecting the security of other sessions.
Finally, the protocol must resist on-line dictionary attacks. If the attacker is directly engaging in the key exchange, there is no way to prevent such an attacker trying a random guess of the password. However, a secure PAKE scheme should mitigate the effect of the on-line attack to the minimum -in the best case, the attacker can only guess exactly one password per impersonation attempt. Consecutively failed attempts can be easily detected and thwarted accordingly.
Some papers add an extra "server compromise resistance" requirement: an attacker should not be able to impersonate users to a server after he has stolen the password verification files stored on that server, but has not performed dictionary attacks to recover the passwords [7, 17, 28] . Protocols designed with this additional requirement are known as the augmented PAKE, as opposed to the balanced PAKE that does not have this requirement.
However, the so-called "server compromise resistance" is disputable [24] . First, one may ask whether the threat of impersonating users to a compromised server is significantly realistic. After all, the server had been compromised and the stored password files had been stolen. Second, none of the augmented schemes can provide any real assurance once the server is indeed compromised. If the password verification files are stolen, off-line exhaustive search attacks are inevitable. All passwords will need to be revoked and updated anyway.
Another argument in favor of the augmented PAKE is that the server does not store a plaintext password so it is more secure than the balanced PAKE [28] . This is a misunderstanding. The EKE and SPEKE protocols are two examples of the balanced PAKE. Though the original EKE and SPEKE papers only mention the use the plaintext password as the shared secret between the client and server [10, 16] , it is trivial to use a hash of the password (possibly with some salts) as the shared secret if needed. So, the augmented PAKE has no advantage in this aspect.
Overall, the claimed advantages of an augmented PAKE over a balanced one are doubtful. On the other hand, the disadvantages are notable. With the added "server compromise resistance" requirement that none of the augmented PAKE schemes truly satisfy [7, 17, 28] , an augmented PAKE protocol is significantly more complex and more computationally expensive. The extra complexity opens more opportunities to the attacker, as many of the attacks are applicable on the augmented PAKE [7] .
Review on EKE and SPEKE
In this section, we review the two perhaps most well-known balanced PAKE protocols: EKE [10] and SPEKE [16] .
Both techniques are patented and have been deployed in commercial applications.
There are many other PAKE protocols in the past literature. Notable examples include the Abdalla-Pointcheval [1] , GL [33] , KOY [34] and Jiang-Gong [35] protocols. Another well-known technique is a variant of the EKE protocol with formal security proofs due to Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [5] (though the proofs are disputed in [7, 32] , as we will explain later). However, in general, all these protocols are significantly more complex and less efficient than the EKE and SPEKE protocols. In this paper, we will focus on comparing our technique to the EKE and SPEKE protocols.
First, let us look at the EKE. Bellovin and Merrit introduced two EKE constructs: based on RSA (which was later shown insecure [23] ) and Diffie-Hellman (DH). Here, we only describe the latter, which modifies a basic DH protocol by symmetrically encrypting the exchanged items. Let α be a primitive root modulo p. In the protocol, [10] .
It has been shown that a straightforward implementation of the above protocol is insecure [20] . Since the password is too weak to be used as a normal encryption key, the content within the symmetric cipher must be strictly random. r can be found in [10] . However, this solution was explained in an ad-hoc way, and it involves changing the existing protocol specification. Due to lack of a complete description of the final protocol, it is difficult to assess its security.
Alternatively, Jaspan suggests addressing this issue by choosing p as close to a power of 2 as possible [20] . This might alleviate the issue, but does not resolve it.
The above reported weakness in EKE suggests that formal security proofs are unlikely without introducing new assumptions. Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway introduced a formal model based on an "ideal cipher" [5] . They applied this model to formally prove that EKE is "provably secure". However, this result is disputed in [7, 32] .
The so-called "ideal cipher" was not concretely defined in [5] ; it was only later clarified by Boyd et al. in [7] : the assumed cipher works like a random function in encryption, but must map fixed-size strings to elements of G in decryption (also see [32] ). Clearly, no such ciphers are readily available yet. Several proposed instantiations of such an "ideal cipher" were easily broken [32] .
Another limitation with the EKE protocol is that it does not securely accommodate short exponents. The protocol definition requires α x a and α x b be uniformly distributed over the whole group Z * p [10] . Therefore, the secret keys There are however risks of using a password-derived variable as the base, as pointed out by Zhang [31] . attacker side information that the 1023 − 160 = 863 most significant bits in a full-length key are all '0's. The security is not reassuring, as the author later acknowledged in [19] .
To sum up, an EKE has the drawback of leaking partial information about the password to a passive attacker.
As for a SPEKE, it has the problem that an active attacker may test multiple passwords in one protocol execution. Furthermore, neither protocol accommodates short exponents securely. Finally, neither protocol has security proofs; to prove the security would require introducing new security assumptions [5] or relaxing security requirements [26] .
J-PAKE Protocol
In this section, we present a new balanced PAKE protocol called Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE). The key exchange is carried out over an unsecured network. In such a network, there is no secrecy in communication, so transmitting a message is essentially no different from broadcasting it to all. Worse, the broadcast is unauthenticated. An attacker can intercept a message, change it at will, and then relay the modified message to the intended recipient.
It is perhaps surprising that we are still able to establish a private and authenticated channel in such a hostile environment solely based on a shared password -in other words, bootstrapping a high-entropy cryptographic key from a low-entropy secret. The protocol works as follows.
Let G denote a subgroup of Z * p with prime order q in which the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is intractable [6] . Let g be a generator in G. The two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, both agree on (G, g).
Let s be their shared password 3 , and s = 0 for any non-empty password. We assume the value of s falls within
Alice selects two secret values x 1 and x 2 at random:
. Similarly, Bob selects
Note that x 2 , x 4 = 0; the reason will be evident in security analysis. 
where H is a hash function.
The two-round J-PAKE protocol can serve as a drop-in replacement for face-to-face key exchange. It is like Alice and Bob meet in person and secretly agree a common key. So far, the authentication is implicit: Alice believes only Bob can derive the same key and vice versa. In some applications, Alice and Bob may want to perform an explicit key confirmation just to make sure the other party actually holds the same key.
There are several ways to achieve explicit key confirmation. In general, it is desirable to use a different key from the session key for key confirmation. This is trivial to do, say use κ = H(K, 1). We summarize a few methods, which are generically applicable to all key exchange schemes. A simple method is to use a hash function as suggested in SPEKE: Alice sends H(H(κ )) to Bob and Bob replies with H(κ ). Another straightforward way is to use κ to encrypt a known value (or random challenge) as presented in EKE. Other approaches make use of MAC functions as suggested in [36] . Given that the underlying functions are secure, these methods do not differ significantly in security.
In the protocol, senders need to produce valid knowledge proofs. Proof (ZKP) is a well-established primitive in cryptography; it allows one to prove his knowledge of a discrete logarithm without revealing it [29] .
As one example, we could use Schnorr's signature [30] , which is non-interactive, and reveals nothing except the one bit information: "whether the signer knows the discrete logarithm". Let H be a secure hash function 4 . To prove the knowledge of the exponent for X = g x , one sends {SignerID, V = g v , r = v − xh} where SignerID is the unique user identifier, v ∈ R Z q and h = H(g, V, X, SignerID). The receiver verifies that X lies in the prime-order subgroup G and that g v equals g r X h . Adding the unique SignerID into the hash function is to prevent Alice replaying Bob's signature back to Bob and vice versa. Note that for Schnorr's signature, it takes one exponentiation to generate it and two to verify it (computing g r · X h requires roughly one exponentiation using the simultaneous computation technique [37] ) .
Security analysis
In this section, we show the protocol fulfills all the security requirements listed in Section 2.1. First, we discuss the protocol's resistance against the off-line dictionary attack. Without loss of generality, assume Alice is honest.
Her ciphertext A contains the term (x 1 + x 3 + x 4 ) on the exponent. Let x a = x 1 + x 3 + x 4 . The following lemma shows the security property of xa.
Lemma 1 The xa is a secret of random value over Zq to Bob.
Proof. The value x 1 is uniformly distributed over Z q and unknown to Bob. The knowledge proofs required in the protocol show that Bob knows x3 and x4. By definition xa is computed from x3 and x4 (known to Bob) plus a random number x 1 . Therefore x a must be randomly distributed over Z q .
In the second round of the protocol, Alice sends A = g
to Bob, where ga = g x 1 +x 3 +x 4 . Here, ga serves as a generator. As the group G has prime order, any non-identity element is a generator [29] . So Alice can explicitly check g a = 1 to ensure it is a generator. In fact, Lemma 1 shows that x 1 + x 3 + x 4 is random over Z q even in the face of active attacks. Hence, ga = 1 is implicitly guaranteed by the probability. The chance of ga = 1 is extremely minuscule -on the order of 2 −160 for 160-bit q. Symmetrically, the same argument applies to the Bob's case. For the same reason, it is implicitly guaranteed by probability that x 1 + x 3 = 0, hence K = g (x 1 +x 3 )·x 2 ·x 4 ·s = 1 holds with an exceedingly overwhelming probability. [29] , Bob cannot distinguish A from a random non-identity element in the group.
The above theorem indicates that if Alice is talking directly to an attacker, she does not reveal any useful information about the password. Based on the protocol symmetry, the above results can be easily adapted from
Alice's perspective -Alice cannot compute (x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ), nor distinguish B from a random element in the group.
The off-line dictionary attack resistance against an active attacker does not however necessarily imply resistance against a passive attacker. Therefore, we need the following theorem to show if Alice is talking to authentic Bob, there is no information leakage on the password too. Next, we discuss the forward secrecy. In the following theorem, we consider a passive attacker who knows the password secret s. As we explained earlier, the ZKPs in the protocol require Alice and Bob know the values of x1 and x3 respectively, hence x1 + x3 = 0 (thus K = 1) holds with an exceedingly overwhelming probability even in the face of active attacks. 6 , given that K = 1, the past session keys derived from the protocol remain incomputable even when the secret s is later disclosed.
Theorem 4 (Forward secrecy) Under the Square Computational Diffie-Hellman (SCDH) assumption
Proof. After knowing s, the passive attacker wants to compute κ = H(K) given inputs: {g
Assume the attacker is able to compute K = g (x 1 +x 3 )·x 2 ·x 4 from those inputs. For simplicity, let
mod q. Since K = 1, we have x5 = 0. The attacker behaves like an oracle -given the ordered inputs {g
This oracle can be used to solve the SCDH problem as follows.
For g x where x ∈R [1, q − 1], we query the oracle by supplying {g
a, b are arbitrary values chosen from Zq, and obtain f (g
In this way,
2 +(3−2a−2b+ab)·x+1−a−b+ab . Now we are able to compute g
. This, however, contradicts the SCDH assumption [4] , which states that one cannot compute g
We now consider the case when a session key is compromised. Unlike ephemeral private keys that exist only during the key exchange, a session key lasts throughout the communication session, which might increase its likelihood of exposure. Here, we do not consider the exposure of the ephemeral private keys. If an attacker is powerful enough to compromise the ephemeral private key, he has possessed the power to break all the existing PAKE protocols [1, 5, 7, 10, 16, 17, 28, [33] [34] [35] In our protocol, a known session key does not affect the security of other session keys. The raw session key
·s is determined by the ephemeral random inputs from both parties in the session. As we mentioned earlier, the probability has implicitly guaranteed that K = 1 even in the face of active attacks. The following theorem shows that the obtained session key is random. Therefore, compromising a session key has no effect on other session keys.
Theorem 5 (Random session key) Under the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, given that K = 1, the past session key derived from the protocol is indistinguishable from a random non-identity element in G.
Proof. By protocol definition, x2, x4 ∈R [1, q − 1], and s ∈ [1, q − 1]. Since K = g (x 1 +x 3 )·x 2 ·x 4 ·s = 1, we have
. Based on the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption [29] , the value g a·b is indistinguishable from a random non-identity element in the group.
Finally, we study an active attacker, who directly engages in the protocol execution. Without loss of generality, we assume Alice is honest, and Bob is compromised (i.e., an attacker).
In the protocol, Bob demonstrates that he knows x4 and the exponent of g b , where g b = g x 1 +x 2 +x 3 . Therefore, the format of the ciphertext sent by Bob can be described as B = g b x 4 ·s , where s is a value that Bob (the attacker)
can choose freely. Proof. After receiving B , Alice computes
To obtain a contradiction, we reveal x 1 and s, and assume that the attacker is now able to compute K . and s revealed, the attacker is still unable to compute K (and hence cannot perform key confirmation later).
The above theorem shows that what an on-line attacker can learn from the protocol is only minimal. Because of the knowledge proofs, the attacker is left with the only freedom to choose an arbitrary s . If s = s, he is unable to derive the same session key as Alice. During the later key confirmation process, the attacker will learn one-bit information: whether s and s are equal. This is the best that any PAKE protocol can possibly achieve, because by nature we cannot stop an imposter from trying a random guess of password. However, consecutively failed guesses can be easily detected, and thwarted accordingly. The security properties of our protocol are summarized in Table 1 .
Comparison
In this section, we compare our protocol with two other balanced PAKE schemes: EKE and SPEKE. These two techniques have several variants, which follow very similar constructs [7] . However, it is beyond the scope of this The EKE and SPEKE are among the simplest and most efficient PAKE schemes. Both protocols can be executed in one round, while J-PAKE requires two rounds. On the computational aspect, both protocol require each user to perform only two exponentiations, compared with 14 exponentiations in J-PAKE (see Table 2 ).
At first glance, the J-PAKE scheme looks too computationally expensive. However, note that both the EKE and SPEKE protocols must use long exponents (see Section 2.2). Since the cost of exponentiation is linear with the bit-length of the exponent [29] , for a typical 1024-bit p and 160-bit q setting, one exponentiation in an EKE or SPEKE is equivalent in cost to 6-7 exponentiations in a J-PAKE. Hence, the overall computational costs for EKE, SPEKE and J-PAKE are actually about the same.
improvements
One notable feature of the J-PAKE design is the use of the Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP), specifically: Schnorr
Signature [30] . The ZKP is a well-established cryptographic primitive [9] . For over twenty years, this primitive has been playing a pivotal role in general two/multi-party secure computations [38] .
Authenticated key exchange is essentially a two-party secure computation problem. However, the use of ZKP in this area is rare. The main concern is on efficiency: the ZKP is perceived as computational expensive. So far, almost all of the past PAKE protocols have avoided using ZKP for exactly the reason.
However, the use of ZKP does not necessarily mean the protocol must be inefficient. This largely depends on how to effectively integrate this primitive into the overall design. In our construction, we introduced a novel juggling technique: arranging the random public keys in such a structured way that the randomization factors vanish when both sides supplied the same password. (A similar use of this juggling technique can be traced back to [15] and [8] ). As we have shown, this leads to computational efficiency that is comparable to the EKE and SPEKE protocols. To our best knowledge, this design is significantly different from all past PAKE protocols. In the area of PAKE research -which has been troubled by many patent arguments surrounding existing schemes [13] -a new construct may be helpful.
With the same juggling idea, the current construction of the J-PAKE protocol seems close to the optimum. Note in the protocol, we used four x terms -x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 . As if one cannot juggle with only two balls, we find it difficult to juggle with two x terms. This is not an issue in the multi-party setting where there are at least three participants (each participant generates one "ball") [15] . For the two-party case, our solution was to let each user create two ephemeral public keys, and thus preserve the protocol symmetry. It seems unlikely that one could improve the protocol efficiency by using a total of only 3 (or even 2) x terms. However, we do not have a proof of minimality on this, so we leave the question open.
In terms of implementation, there are several possible improvements. First, in J-PAKE, each user needs to perform 14 exponentiations, but actually many of the operations are merely repetitions. Let the bit length of the exponent be L = log 2 q. Computing g x 1 alone requires roughly 1.5L multiplications which include L square operations and 0.5L multiplications of the square terms. However, the same square operations need not be repeated for other items with the same base g (i.e., g x 2 etc). This provides plenty room for efficiency optimization in a practical implementation. In contrast, the same optimization is not applicable to the EKE and SPEKE. Second, it would be more efficient, particularly on mobile devices, to implement J-PAKE using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
Using ECC essentially replaces the multiplicative cyclic group with an additive cyclic group defined over some elliptic curve. The basic protocol construction remains unchanged.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a protocol, called J-PAKE, which authenticates a password with zero-knowledge and then subsequently creates a strong session key if the password is correct. We showed that the protocol fulfills the following properties: it prevents off-line dictionary attacks; provides forward secrecy; insulates a known session key from affecting any other sessions; and strictly limits an active attacker to guess only one password per protocol execution. As compared to the de facto internet standard SSL/TLS, J-PAKE is more lightweight in password authentication with two notable advantages: 1). It requires no PKI deployments; 2). It protects users from leaking passwords (say to a fake bank website).
